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The Department of Agriculture’s Rules of Practice: Do 
They Still Serve Both the Department’s and the Public’s 
Needs? 
By Peter M. Davenport
This article raises the question of whether the Rules of 
Practice for the U.S. Department of Agriculture1 (the Department) 
continue to appropriately serve the interests of both the Department 
and the public, which the Department is charged with serving.  After 
examining multiple shortcomings of the current provisions, it will be 
concluded that the current rules of practice at the Department 
urgently need significant revision.
Administrative law judges at the Department and other 
federal agencies conduct formal hearings under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). 2 The proceedings mirror federal civil 
* Peter M. Davenport is currently the Chief Administrative Law Judge for 
the United States Department of Agriculture.  He was initially appointed as an 
administrative law judge in May of 1994 for the Office of Hearings and Appeals for 
Health and Human Services in Paducah, Kentucky.  In 1995, following the 
establishment of the Social Security Administration (SSA) as an independent 
agency, he transferred to that agency and remained in Paducah until May of 1996 
when he transferred to the Lexington, Kentucky Office of Hearings and Appeals for 
SSA.  In January of 1995, he transferred to the Department of Agriculture.  Prior to 
becoming Chief Judge, he served as Acting Chief Judge from January of 2010 until 
his appointment as Chief Judge in June of that year.  Before being appointed a 
judge he was in the private practice of law in Lexington, Kentucky, and served as 
an Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky.  Judge 
Davenport is a member of the National Association of Administrative Law 
Judiciary and is a past president of the Federal Administrative Law Judges 
Conference.  He holds undergraduate and law degrees from the University of 
Kentucky and has an LLM degree from George Washington University.  Special 
recognition is given to James Hurt, Attorney Advisor at the Department of 
Agriculture, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.  The 
views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be construed as 
representing Departmental policy.
1 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130–1.151 (2013).
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557 (1946).
                                                        
    
568 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
litigation and are governed by applicable rules of evidence and 
procedure, and the judges are insulated from political influence.3 An 
administrative law judge is considered “functionally comparable” to, 
and acts as the equivalent of, a trial judge.4
The types of cases heard by the Department’s administrative 
law judges involve a full spectrum of complexity, from presiding 
over rule-making hearings, certifying the record, and simple reviews 
of administrative records, to lengthy and complex extended trials 
lasting weeks or even months.  The underlying subject matter ranges 
from fruit flies to elephants; from currants to watermelons; and from 
specific components of milk and milk-related products to the 
underlying permit compliance requirements in hydroelectric power or 
timber cases.  Given the variety of cases, it is easily understood why 
the rules of practice governing the proceedings are essential to a just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination in every proceeding.  As of 
December 2012, the Office of Personnel Management reported that 
there were 1,817 administrative law judges at thirty federal executive 
agencies. 5 Although many similarities may exist, the rules of 
practice at the various agencies that have administrative law judges 
differ considerably, with some having very detailed and lengthy 
provisions and others with only a very limited number of general 
provisions.6
3 See Tennessee v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 326 F.3d 729, 735–36 (6th Cir. 
2003).
4 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978); see also Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 756–57 (2002).
5 Federal Administrative Law Judges by Agency and Level, U.S. OFFICE OF 
PERS. MGMT. (Dec. 2012), http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/datadefn/aehri_sdm.asp.
6 Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.121–1201.148 (2013); Nat’l Fed. 
Labor Relations Auth., 5 C.F.R. §§ 2429.1–2429.18 (2013); Office of Fin. Inst. 
Adjudication, 12 C.F.R. §§ 308.1–308.41 (2013); Small Bus. Admin., 13 C.F.R. §§ 
134.201–134.229 (2013); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 17 C.F.R. §§ 
10.1–10.114 (2013); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.100–201.193 (2013); 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1–3.83 (2013); Int’l Trade Comm’n, 19 C.F.R. 
§§ 207.2–207.8 (2013); Soc. Sec. Admin., 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.301–405.383 (2013);
Food & Drug Admin. & Drug Enforcement Admin., 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.41–1316.68 
(2013); Housing & Urban Dev., 24 C.F.R. §§ 26.1–26.27 (2013) & 31 C.F.R. §§ 
285.11–285.13; Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 29 C.F.R. §§ 
2200.1–2200.12 (2013); Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 46 C.F.R. §§ 502.21–502.605 (2013); 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.101–385.1013 (2012); Dep’t of 
Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 6.1–6.46 (2012); Labor Relations Bd., 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.31–
101.36 (2012); Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2700.1–
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The Department’s current Rules of Practice Governing 
Formal Adjudicatory Administrative Proceedings Instituted by the 
Secretary7 have remained largely unchanged since their last major 
revision in 1977.8 Despite the fact that a number of Acts have since 
been repealed9 and other provisions added, the current rules indicate 
that they are applicable to nearly fifty statutes that require a formal 
adjudicatory hearing under the APA before an administrative law 
judge. 10 They are also applicable to “[o]ther adjudicatory 
2700.110 (2012); U.S. Coast Guard, 33 C.F.R. §§ 1.07–1.30 (2012); Dep’t of Educ.,
34 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.131 (2012); U.S. Postal Serv., 39 C.F.R. §§ 952.1–952.24 
(2012); Envtl. Prot. Agency, 40 C.F.R. §§ 24.01–24.20 (2012); Health & Human 
Servs., 42 C.F.R. §§ 402.1–402.308 (2012); Dep’t of the Interior, 43 C.F.R §§ 4.1–
4.31, 4.470–4.628, 4.1100–4.1394 (2012); Dep’t of Transp., 49 C.F.R. §§ 31.1–
31.47 (2012); Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 49 C.F.R. §§ 821.1–821.64 (2012); Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.201–1.364 (2003).
7 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130–1.151 (2013).
8 42 F.R. 743 (Jan. 4, 1977).
9 See generally Act of August 20, 1890 § 6, amended by 21 U.S.C. § 104 
(repealed 2002); Act of March 3, 1905 § 6, amended by 21 U.S.C. § 127 (repealed 
2002); Act of July 2, 1962 § 6(a), amended by 21 U.S.C. § 134(e) (repealed 2002); 
Act of May 6, 1970 § 2, amended by 21 U.S.C. § 135(a) (repealed 2002); Cattle 
Contagious Diseases Act of 1903, § 3, amended by 21 U.S.C. § 122 (repealed 
2002).  
10 U.S. Cotton Standards Act § 3, supplemented by § 2 of 47 Stat. 1621, 7 
U.S.C. § 51b, 53 (2006); U.S. Grain Standards Act §§ 7(g)(3), 9, 10, 17A(d), 7 
U.S.C. §§ 79(g)(3), 85, 86, 87f–1(d) (2006); Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921 §§ 
203, 312, 401, supplemented by §§ 1, 57 Stat. 422, amended by §§ 4, 90 Stat. 1249, 
7 U.S.C. §§ 193, 204, 213, 221 (2002); U.S. Warehouse Act §§ 12, 25, 7 U.S.C. §§ 
246, 253 (2006); Poultry Prods. Inspection Act §§ 6, 7, 8(d), 18, 21 U.S.C. §§ 455, 
456, 457(d), 467 (2006); Perishable Agric. Commodities Act of 1930 §§ 1(b)(9), 
3(c), 4(d), 6(c), 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), 8(e), 9, 13(a), 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a(b)(9), 499c(c), 
499d(d), 499f(c), 499h(a), 499h(b), 499h(c), 499h(e), 499i, 499m(a) (2006); Agric. 
Mktg. Agreement Act of 1937, amended by 7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(14) (2006); Fed. 
Seed Act § 409, 7 U.S.C. § 1599 (2006); Animal Welfare Act § 19, 7 U.S.C. § 2149 
(2006); Title V of Agric. Risk Prot. Act of 2000 § 501(a), 7 U.S.C. § 2279(e) 
(2006); Potato Research & Promotion Act, amended by 7 U.S.C. § 2621 (2006); 
Egg Research & Consumer Info. Act, amended by 7 U.S.C. § 2714 (2006);  Beef 
Promotion & Research Act of 1985 § 9, 7 U.S.C. § 2908 (2006); Swine Health Prot. 
Act §§ 5,6, 7 U.S.C. §§ 3804, 3805 (2006); Honey Research, Promotion, & 
Consumer Info. Act § 11, 7 U.S.C. § 4610 (2006); Pork Promotion, Research, & 
Consumer Info. Act of 1985 § 1626, 7 U.S.C. § 4815 (2006); Watermelon Research 
& Promotion Act § 1651, 7 U.S.C. § 4910 (2006); Pecan Promotion & Research 
Act of 1990 § 1914, 7 U.S.C. § 6009 (2006); Mushroom Promotion, Research, & 
Consumer Info. Act of 1990 § 1928, 7 U.S.C. § 6107 (2006); Lime Research, 
Promotion, & Consumer Info. Act of 1990 § 1958, amended by 7 U.S.C. § 6207 
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proceedings in which the complaint instituting the proceeding so 
provides with the concurrence of the [Department’s] Assistant 
Secretary for Administration.”11 Significantly, although a provision 
exists in the current rules concerning their scope and applicability,12
nowhere is there, at present, a mention of their purpose being the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every proceeding in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Civil Rules).13 As will be 
seen, this is truly a significant omission and one that needs 
correction.
(2006); Soybean Promotion, Research, & Consumer Info. Act § 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 
6307 (2006); Fluid Milk Promotion Act of 1990 § 1999 (L), 7 U.S.C. § 6411 
(2006); Organic Foods Prod. Act of 1990 §§ 2119, 2120, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6519, 6520 
(2006); Fresh Cut Flowers & Fresh Cut Greens Promotion & Consumer Info. Act of 
1993 § 9, 7 U.S.C. § 6808 (2006); Sheep Promotion, Research, & Info. Act of 1994, 
7 U.S.C. § 7107 (2006); Plant Prot. Act § 424, 7 U.S.C. § 7734 (2006); Animal 
Health Prot. Act § 10414, 7 U.S.C. § 8313 (2006); Agric. Bioterrorism Prot. Act of 
2002 § 212(i), 7 U.S.C. § 8401(i) (2006); Horse Prot. Act of 1970 §§ 4(c), 6, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1823(c), 1825 (2006); Forest Res. Conservation & Shortage Relief Act of 
1990 § 492, 16 U.S.C. § 620(d) (2006);  Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(a), 
amended by 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (2006); Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 § 4 (a)–
(b), 16 U.S.C. § 3373(a)–(b) (2006); Virus-Serum-Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. § 156 
(2006); Fed. Meat Inspection Act §§ 4, 6, 7(e), 8, 401, 21 U.S.C §§ 604, 606, 
607(e), 608, 671 (2006); Egg Prods. Inspection Act § 18, 21 U.S.C. § 1047 (2006); 
Fed. Land Policy & Mgmt. Act of 1976 § 506, 43 U.S.C. § 1766 (2006).  These 
rules of practice shall also be applicable to the following: (1) adjudicatory 
proceedings under the regulations promulgated under the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1621–1632(b), for the denial or withdrawal of inspection, 
certification, or grading service; (2) adjudicatory proceedings under the regulations 
promulgated under the Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8322, for 
the suspension or revocation of accreditation of veterinarians, 9 C.F.R. §§ 160.1, 
161.1–161.7; (3) proceedings for debarment of counsel under § 1.141(d) of this 
subpart; (4) adjudicatory proceedings under the regulations promulgated under the 
Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159, for the denial of an initial license 
application, 9 C.F.R. § 2.11, or the termination of a license during the license 
renewal process or at any other time, 9 C.F.R. § 2.12; (5) adjudicatory proceedings 
under the regulations promulgated under sections 901 through 905 of the Federal 
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 7 U.S.C. § 1901, pertaining to 
the commercial transportation of equines to slaughtering facilities, 9 C.F.R. §§ 
88.1–88.6; and (6) other adjudicatory proceedings in which the complainant 
instituting the proceeding so provides with the concurrence of the Assistant 
Secretary for Administration. 
11 7 C.F.R. § 1.131(b)(6).
12 See § 1.131.
13 See FED R. CIV. P. 1.
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The Department’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, like those 
of other executive agencies, are analogous to the Federal Civil Rules 
used in the U.S. district courts.  Congress authorized the U.S. 
Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the district courts in 1934 under 
the Rules Enabling Act.14 The original version of those rules became 
effective on September 16, 1938. 15 Significant amendments were 
made to the Federal Civil Rules in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 
1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010. 16 The 
procedural rules for the Department have not kept pace with the 
changes to the Federal Civil Rules.  However, adopting procedures 
that federal district courts have developed and refined over the years 
would significantly improve the utility of the current Part 1, Subpart 
H rules.17
In comparison to the Federal Civil Rules, even a cursory 
reading of the Department’s provisions reflects that the language in 
the current Part 1, Subpart H rules could be stated more clearly—
something the 2007 style amendments to the Federal Civil Rules 
highlight.18 Those style amendments were the first comprehensive 
overhaul since the Federal Civil Rules were adopted in 1938. 19
Taking more than four years to complete, the style amendments 
aspired to simplify and clarify federal procedure.  The more austere 
sentence structure used throughout the restyled Federal Civil Rules 
made them shorter, easier to read, and more clearly articulated.  The 
Restyled Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure took effect in 1998, 
and the restyled Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became 
effective in 2002.20 Further, 
Sources that guided drafting, usage, and style for all 
three revisions included the Guidelines for Drafting 
14 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
15 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES 




17 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130–1.151.
18 See generally FED R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s notes.
19 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE xii (Vicki 
Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2012).
20 77 Fed. Reg. 233 (Dec. 4, 2012); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory 
committee’s notes to the 2007 amendments.
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and Editing Court Rules, which the Standing 
Committee on Federal Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States published at 169 F.R.D. 171 (1997), and 
Bryan A. Garner's A Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage (2d ed. 1995).21
The purpose of the style revisions was twofold: to make the 
rules easier to understand and to make style and terminology 
consistent throughout the rules.22 The restyled Federal Civil Rules 
reduced the use of inconsistent, ambiguous, redundant, repetitive, or 
archaic words.  For example, the restyled rules replaced “shall” with 
“must,” “may,” or “should,” as appropriate.23 The sole exception was 
the highly controversial restoration of the “shall” in Rule 56(a) of the 
Federal Civil Rules on summary judgment, when it was amended in 
2010. 24 Any amendments to Part 1, Subpart H certainly should 
attempt to incorporate and emulate those improvements.
Simplification of regulatory language would appear to be 
mandated by both Executive Order 12,866, which requires that 
regulations be “simple and easy to understand, with the goal of 
minimizing the potential for uncertainty and litigation,” 25 and 
Executive Order 12,988, which requires that regulations be written in 
“clear language.”26 The Plain Writing Act of 2010, while not directly 
applicable to regulations, recognizes the value of plain writing in 
government documents by requiring clear, concise, and well-
organized publications.27 To further promote the goal of the use of 
understandable language in regulatory publications, the Office of 
Management and Budget has published a Federal Plain Language 
Guidelines, which is available on the Internet.28
21 Id.
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s notes to the 2007 
amendments.
23 Id.
24 See FED. R. CIV. P 56 advisory committee’s notes to the 2010 
amendments.
25 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
26 Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4,729 (Feb. 5, 1996).
27 Plain Writing Act of 2010, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
28 Federal Plain Language Guidelines, PLAINLANGUAGE.GOV (May 1, 
2011), available at
http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines/FederalPLG
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Regular periodic review of regulations by executive agencies 
is expected under Section 6(a) of Executive Order 13,563, which 
provides: “To facilitate the periodic review of existing significant 
regulations, agencies shall consider how best to promote 
retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, 
insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, 
expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned.”29
Replacing and revising outmoded and inappropriate rules 
with more readily understandable versions is accordingly strongly 
encouraged wherever indicated.  Given the rapid and continual 
changes in technology, opportunities to utilize full advantage of such 
advances must be carefully examined, options must be explored, and 
the advances must be implemented in a timely fashion where 
appropriate.  The failure to do so should not be considered 
acceptable.
The Federal Civil Rules used in all federal courts have proved 
to be extraordinarily helpful in providing litigants with predictable 
and familiar rules governing hearing procedure, and they are 
generally mirrored in the procedural rules of nearly all of the states.30
Using language similar or identical to an applicable Federal Civil
Rules provision would gain the advantage of the broad experience of 
the federal courts and the well-developed precedent they have created 
to guide litigants, judges, and reviewing authorities within the 
Department on procedure.  Parties and judges would also acquire the 
additional advantage of focusing primarily on the substance of the 
uidelines.pdf; see also Plain Writing Act of 2010: Federal Agency Requirements,
PLAINLANGUAGE.GOV (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines/TOC.cfm.
29 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
30 A 2010 study surveyed lawyers who were the attorneys of record in 
federal civil cases that terminated in the last quarter of 2008 about their satisfaction 
with the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See EMERY G. LEE III &
THOMAS E. WILLGING, ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES 3, 9 (2010).  The sample also included lawyers from the Litigation 
Section of the American Bar Association and from the National Employment 
Lawyers Association.  Id. The survey instrument was developed jointly by the 
American College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System and found widespread satisfaction and endorsement of the 
rules.  Id.
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administrative disputes, spending less time on the distraction of 
litigating about procedure.
Unlike many of the rules of practice of other agencies having 
administrative law judges—which either incorporate or reference the 
Federal Civil Rules—the Department has steadfastly and repeatedly 
resisted even the slightest alignment of its rules with the Federal 
Civil Rules.  All attempts and efforts to incorporate or invoke the 
Federal Civil Rules in any way have been repeatedly, emphatically, 
and adamantly rejected.31
The reasons for such a serious philosophical disagreement 
with the otherwise widely accepted use of the Federal Civil Rules at 
the Department are not clear, particularly when core values 
governing administrative proceedings require fairness, 
responsiveness to program goals, cost effectiveness, and acceptability 
of results to those affected.32 While a specialized bar thoroughly 
familiar with the Department’s Rules of Practice clearly exists, their 
number is far exceeded by an overwhelming majority of general 
practitioners throughout the United States who remain largely, if not 
totally unfamiliar with some of the more unusual and almost 
Byzantine provisions found in the current rules.  As a result, the 
typical general practitioners that traditionally represent most of the 
respondents appearing before the Department’s administrative law 
judges are often at a decided disadvantage, being obligated by ethical 
considerations to quickly master unfamiliar rules and concepts in 
order to adequately, ethically, and competently represent their clients.  
It goes without saying that the learning curve for a pro se litigant is 
even steeper.
31 See Arends, No. 11-0147, 2011 WL 5901382 (U.S.D.A. Nov. 15, 2011); 
Vanishing Species Wildlife, Inc., No. 10-0194, 2010 WL 4663162 (U.S.D.A. Nov. 
3, 2010); Tung Wan Co., No. D-06-0019, 2007 WL 1378158 (U.S.D.A. Apr. 25, 
2007); Post & Taback, Inc., No. D-01-0026, 2003 WL 22965185 (U.S.D.A. Dec. 
16, 2003); Heartland Kennels, Inc., No. 02-0004, 2002 WL 31396960 (U.S.D.A. 
Oct. 8, 2002); Mitchell, 60 Agric. Dec. 91 (U.S.D.A. 2001); Zeus Serv., S.A. v. 
L.A. Wroten Co., 60 Agric. Dec. 806 (U.S.D.A. 2001); Fresh Prep, Inc., 58 Agric. 
Dec. 683 (U.S.D.A. 1999); Noell, 58 Agric. Dec. 130 (U.S.D.A. 1999); Kreider 
Dairy Farms, Inc., 57 Agric. Dec. 413 (U.S.D.A. 1998); United Foods, Inc., 57 
Agric. Dec. 329 (U.S.D.A. 1998); Far W. Meats, 55 Agric. Dec. 1045 (U.S.D.A. 
1996).
32 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE ix–xi 
(West Publ’g. Co., 3d ed. 2010).
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In addition to containing some unusual provisions, the 
haphazard, illogical, and almost random organization of the 
Department’s Rules of Practice makes negotiation of the current 
provisions difficult even for those with some familiarity with their 
content.  One looking for a logical sequence to the current rules will 
be sadly disappointed and frustrated.  As might be expected, rules 
pertaining to the meaning of words, information about the scope and 
applicability of the subpart, and definitions are contained at the 
beginning of each subpart.  They are followed by requirements for 
the content of the complaint and answer.  But provisions relating to 
service 33 are located near the end of the subpart and inexplicably 
appear after rules dealing with consent decisions, 34 hearing 
procedures, 35 and appeals to the Judicial Officer. 36 Provisions 
relating to depositions and issuance of subpoenas also follow those 
dealing with appeals and petitions for reopening and 
reconsideration.37 Some of the other more problematic areas will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Procedural rules used in federal and nearly all state courts 
contemplate raising defenses to the bringing of an action by motion.38
While generally accepted almost everywhere else without exception, 
such action is specifically not permitted in proceedings before the 
Department, where section 1.143(b)(1) of the Department’s rules 
provides that “[a]ny motion will be entertained other than a motion 
to dismiss on the pleading.” 39 As interpreted by Departmental 
33 7 C.F.R. § 1.147 (2013).
34 § 1.138.
35 § 1.141.
36 § 1.145.  The index in Subpart H makes these particular references.  §§ 
1.130–1.151.
37 § 1.145. 
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 12.
39 7 C.F.R. § 1.143(b)(1) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep't of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 607–08 (D.C. Cir. 1987); GH Dairy, No. M-10-0283, 
2012 WL 1521984 (U.S.D.A. Apr. 24, 2012); Reece, No. 11-0213, 2011 WL 
5829539 (U.S.D.A. Nov. 4, 2011); Lion's Gate Ctr., LLC, No. 09-0069, 2011 WL 
5263575 (U.S.D.A. Sept. 8, 2011); Turner, No. 09-0128, 2011 WL 767883 
(U.S.D.A. Mar. 1, 2011); Am. Dried Fruit Co., No. FV-10-0170, 2010 WL 3457629 
(U.S.D.A. Aug. 20, 2010); Saulsbury Enters., 59 Agric. Dec. 49 (U.S.D.A. 2000); 
Midway Farms, Inc., 58 Agric. Dec. 849 (U.S.D.A. 1999); Fava & Co., Inc., 44 
Agric. Dec. 870 (U.S.D.A. 1985).  But see, e.g., Lion, No. 03-0001, 2006 WL 
3691789 (U.S.D.A. Dec. 5, 2006); Hereford, Tex., Factory, No. 04-0005, 2006 WL 
322355 (U.S.D.A. Feb. 2, 2006).
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precedent, this would include any jurisdictional defenses that could 
commonly be raised under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Civil Rules.  At 
the same time, while invariably continuing to object to any such 
motion filed by a respondent, the Department routinely requests 
dismissal of actions in Rule 15(a) cases involving challenges to 
Marketing Orders40 for failure to strictly comply with petition content 
requirements. 41 The non-entertainment provision has obvious, but 
clearly questionable, advantages for the Department’s attorneys, 
allowing them to avoid addressing even meritorious jurisdictional 
issues and compelling respondents to raise such issues in their 
answers.
While many of the adverse results that stem from the current 
rules could easily be avoided by a liberal approach to interpretation 
of the rules, when matters are appealed to the Department’s Judicial 
Officer, the language found in the current Department rules is almost 
invariably strictly construed.42 One example frequently encountered 
involves requests for hearing.  Although section 1.141(a) of title 7 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations provides that a request for hearing 
can be made by including the request in an answer, section 1.137 
permits amendment of a complaint, petition for review, answer, or 
response to a petition for review “[a]t any time prior to the filing of a 
motion for a hearing.” 43 In response to a certified question, the 
Judicial Officer made it clear that a request for hearing included in a 
complaint or an answer cannot be considered a motion within the 
meaning of section 1.137.44 By way of contrast, when interpretation 
of the terms favored the Department—even though clearly not 
denominated as such—an order to show cause was considered a 
complaint for purposes of the rules, thereby enabling the Department 
to default the other party because of a minimally late answer which 
40 “The term marketing order means any order or any amendment thereto 
which may be issued pursuant to section 8c of the act.”  7 C.F.R. § 900.51(h).
41 See Lion Raisins, Inc., 64 Agric. Dec. 27 (U.S.D.A. 2005); Midway 
Farms, Inc., 58 Agric. Dec. 849 (U.S.D.A. 1999).
42 Pursuant to the Act of April 4, 1940, as amended in 7 U.S.C. §§ 450c–
450g and Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953, the Department’s Judicial Officer has 
been delegated as the individual who serves as the final deciding officer for the 
Department in APA cases and other enumerated cases.  7 C.F.R. § 2.35 (2013); see 
also 7 U.S.C. §§ 450c–450g (2012); 5 U.S.C. app.1 Reorg. Plan 2 1953 (2012).
43 7 C.F.R. § 1.137.
44 Meacham, 47 Agric. Dec. 1708, 1709 (U.S.D.A. 1988).
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had been sent to the Department’s counsel rather than being filed 
with the Hearing Clerk.45
Section 1.137 is frequently relied on by the Department to 
amend a complaint as a matter of right.46 The Department will then
move for default when the respondent fails to file an answer to the 
amended complaint, even though an answer was filed in response to 
the initial complaint and the amendment may have been minor.47
Despite the frequently expressed, traditional judicial preference for 
adjudication on the merits as being considered essential to the 
fundamental fairness of adjudicatory proceedings, the Department’s 
reliance upon aggressive use of procedural rules to achieve resolution 
is generally successful, even where the Department’s administrative 
law judges have sought to afford a respondent a hearing on the merits 
where they believed good cause existed.48
In other instances, rather than filing an amended complaint, 
the Department will file a new action, or in some cases multiple new 
actions, against a respondent.  Although courts have severely 
condemned commencement of additional actions while a first action 
is pending as “unfair harassment,”49 the practice continues routinely.  
This is particularly true in Animal Welfare Act licensure cases, 
where the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service may bring two concurrent actions, with one seeking to 
terminate a license and the second seeking to revoke the same 
license.50
45 Arends, No. 11-0147, 2011 WL 4357280 (U.S.D.A. June 2011).
46 See 7 C.F.R. § 1.137. 
47 See Hamilton, 64 Agric. Dec. 1659 (U.S.D.A. 2005).
48 See Chad Way, 64 Agric. Dec. 401 (U.S.D.A. 2005); Lion Raisins, Inc.,
63 Agric. Dec. 211 (2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Lions Raisins, Inc. v. 
U.S.D.A., 2005 WL 6406066 (E.D. Cal. 2005); see also McCourt, 64 Agric. Dec. 
223 (U.S.D.A. 2005), vacated, 64 Agric. Dec. 654 (U.S.D.A. 2005) (subsequently 
vacated at Department request).  In McCourt, the complainant sought a default 
where opposing counsel’s father’s death contributed to the filing of a late answer.  
McCourt, 64 Agric. Dec. at 223. Notwithstanding the brief period involved and the 
underlying circumstances, the Judicial Officer found the Administrative Law 
Judge’s acceptance of the late answer to be error.  Id.
49 Oberstar v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 494, 504 (8th Cir. 1993).
50 As an example, the Administrator filed both a complaint and, in a 
separate action, an order to show cause for why an Animal Welfare Act license 
should not be terminated on the same day against Lee Marvin Greenly.  In the first 
action, he sought revocation of the license.  Greenly, No. 11-0072, 2012 WL 
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Litigation requires timely filings and actions.  The manner in 
which time is calculated under Rule 6 of the Federal Civil Rules was 
changed in 2009.51 The current federal provisions facilitate parties 
and their lawyers to use a simple, clear, and consistent method of 
calculating time.  Rule 6 counts intervening weekends and holidays 
for all time periods. 52 Most short periods found throughout the 
Federal Civil Rules have been extended to offset the shift in the time 
computation rules and to ensure that each period is reasonable.  Five-
day periods became seven-day periods and ten-day periods became 
fourteen-day periods, in effect maintaining the status quo.  Time 
periods in the Federal Civil Rules shorter than thirty days also were 
revised to multiples of seven days to reduce the likelihood of ending 
on weekends. 53 Other changes to the Federal Civil Rules time 
computation affect how to tell when the last day of a period ends and 
how to compute backward-counted periods that end on a weekend or 
holiday.54
By way of contrast, current Department rules require that 
Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal holidays are included in the 
computation of filings, except where the time expires on those 
dates—in which case the period is extended to the next business 
day. 55 Adoption of the more prevalent Federal computation 
provisions would go far to eliminate confusion on the part of non-
governmental litigants.
Filing deadlines set forth in the Department’s rules are 
invariably strictly construed, and documents must be actually 
received by the Hearing Clerk by the required date without regard to 
the mailing date. 56 Indeed, the Department’s Judicial Officer has 
repeatedly held that he is bound by the Department’s procedural rules 
and lacks authority to depart from its strictures. 57 One resulting 
3877414 (U.S.D.A. Aug. 22, 2012).  In the second, he requested termination of the 
license.  Greenly, No. 11-0073, 2012 WL 3877415 (U.S.D.A. Aug. 22, 2012).
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee notes.
52 Id. at 6.
53 See, e.g., id. at 12, 15.
54 Id. at 6.
55 7 C.F.R. § 1.147(e) (2013).
56 § 1.147(g).
57 Stimson Lumber Co., 56 Agric. Dec. 480, 489 (U.S.D.A. 1997) (cited in 
Boghosian Raisin Packing Co., 62 Agric. Dec. 154, 158 n.4 (U.S.D.A. 2003)) 
(stating generally administrative law judges and the Judicial Officer are bound by 
the Rules of Practice, but they may modify the Rules of Practice to comply with 
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procedural trap, which continues to perplex many non-governmental 
litigants as well as the general bar, is the Department’s failure to 
recognize the “mailbox rule.”58 The Department’s major departure 
from the “mailbox rule,” observed in the federal and most other court 
systems, adds a significant burden to non-governmental litigants.  
This difference has resulted in what most would agree are far too 
many defaults for “late filing.”  
Another pitfall is that, although a copy of the Rules of 
Practice are provided to non-governmental litigants when they are 
served with a copy of the complaint, many, if not most, are generally 
unaware of and often fail to add extra delivery time needed for the 
routine decontamination step (post-September 11, 2001) for all 
incoming Department mail.  Since September 11, the Department 
screens and irradiates all incoming mail, adding a built-in delay of as 
many as twelve to fourteen days between receipt at the Department 
and its delivery to the Hearing Clerk’s Office.  The use of next-day 
delivery by a commercial delivery service provider can avoid some 
delay and is a possible solution.  However, that method adds 
significant additional cost to the non-governmental litigant, 
particularly for lengthy pleadings and multiple copies.  While 
statutory requirements); Jack Stepp, 59 Agric. Dec. 265, 269 n.2 (U.S.D.A 2000) 
(cited in Boghosian Raisin, 62 Agric. Dec. at 158 n.3) (ruling denying respondents' 
petition for reconsideration of order lifting stay and stating the Rules of Practice 
governing formal adjudicatory proceedings instituted by the Secretary under 
various statutes are binding on the Judicial Officer); Far W. Meats, 55 Agric. Dec. 
1033, 1036 n.4 (U.S.D.A. 1996) (cited in Boghosian Raisin, 62 Agric. Dec. at 158 
n.3) (ruling on certified question) (stating the Judicial Officer and the 
administrative law judges are bound by the Rules of Practice governing formal 
adjudicatory proceedings instituted by the Secretary under various statutes); 
Sequoia Orange Co., 41 Agric. Dec. 1062, 1064 (U.S.D.A. 1982) (cited in 
Boghosian Raisin, 62 Agric. Dec. at 158 n.3) (stating the Judicial Officer has no 
authority to depart from the Rules of Practice); see Boghosian Raisin Packing Co., 
62 Agric. Dec. 154, 157–58 (U.S.D.A. 2003) (“The Rules of Practice are binding 
on administrative law judges and the Judicial Officer.”); Pmd Produce Brokerage 
Corp., 59 Agric. Dec. 351, 361 (U.S.D.A. 2000) (“Moreover, it is well settled that 
the administrative law judges are bound by the Rules of Practice”); Kinzua Res., 
LLC, 57 Agric. Dec. 1165, 1179–80 (U.S.D.A. 1998) (cited in Boghosian Raisin,
62 Agric. Dec. at 158 n.4) (stating generally administrative law judges and the 
Judicial Officer are bound by the rules of practice); Lindsay Foods, Inc., 56 Agric. 
Dec. 1643 (U.S.D.A. 1997) (stating the judicial officer and the administrative law 
judges are bound by the Rules of Practice).
58 See 7 C.F.R. § 1.147(c)(1)–(3).
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electronic filing or facsimile transmission could also be potential 
solutions, those technological advances considerably postdate the 
promulgation of the existing rules, so it should come as no surprise 
that there is no provision for their use in the current rules. 
Instead of having the flow of pleadings, amendments, 
answers, motions, briefs, and other documents served upon the 
parties by the litigants themselves—along with appropriate affidavits 
of service—the Department’s rules keep the Hearing Clerk busy by 
requiring the Hearing Clerk to serve those pleadings.59 Under the 
current Department rules, contrary to the practice found in most 
adjudication systems, the burden of serving the complaint and all 
other filed pleadings rests with the Hearing Clerk,60 resulting in a 
built-in delay for preparation of a cover letter and for mailing after 
the document is filed.  Adoption of an electronic filing system by the 
Department—such as now exists in the Federal Court system61—
requiring the parties to serve pleadings upon each other and to certify 
that they have done so, could eliminate that delay, and would make 
the rules considerably more familiar to and consistent with traditional 
methods of practice. 
Additional due process concerns exist with respect to the 
current provisions relating to service.  Although consistently upheld 
on judicial review, actual notice of the proceedings commenced 
against a respondent is not required.62 Under the current regulatory 
scheme, the return of certified mail as “unclaimed” or “refused” 
allows service by regular mail without any further showing that an 
individual has received notice that an action had been commenced 
against him or her; and subsequent challenges to service issues are 
summarily dealt with if the current rules have been followed.  This is 
a particularly significant problem for Animal Welfare Act licensees 
who may be on the road for extended periods during the year with 
traveling circuses.  The most commonly used method of service, 
certified mail, is not required to be delivered to the addressee only; 
59 See § 1.147(b).
60 Id.
61 In the federal system, in most cases, the Clerk now sends an electronic 
notification to opposing counsel that a pleading has been filed.  The opposing 
counsel is then able to access and retrieve it electronically through the PACER 
system.
62 See § 1.147(e).
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any signature is considered acceptable service.63 Mail delivered to a 
former or incorrect address occupied by individuals whose interests 
might be apathetic, hostile, or even antagonistic to a respondent—
such as deliveries to an ex-wife or a disgruntled partner or 
associate—is nonetheless still considered effective service, even 
though such mail is unlikely to be forwarded.  Personal service can 
be ordered by a judge when deemed necessary and appropriate, but 
the Department will usually comply with great and obvious 
reluctance.
The information in certain cases involving trade, proprietary 
secrets, or certain other sensitive information may need to be sealed 
or otherwise protected.  However, the public is typically given free 
access to nearly all documents filed in formal Department 
administrative proceedings.  In this age of increasing instances of 
identity theft, protection of personally sensitive information and 
personal data identifiers takes on new importance.  Although the 
current rules make no provision for the protection of such 
information, clearly an urgent need exists for some new provision 
delineating responsibilities of the parties and specifying what 
information should or should not be included in a pleading or 
document filed with the Hearing Clerk.  Rule 5.2 of the Federal Civil 
Rules currently contains usable provisions relating to individuals’ 
social security numbers, taxpayer-identification numbers, birth dates, 
minors’ names, and financial-account numbers, as well as provisions 
relating to exemptions and waivers that could serve as a useful and 
appropriate guide for the Department.64
Federal and state courts have experienced notable success by 
requiring parties to exchange basic information early in the dispute, 
without the need for a formal discovery demand. 65 Specific 
provisions also require the parties to disclose the opinions of experts 
and to supplement disclosures and discovery responses.66 As noted 
in the Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 26 of the Federal 
Civil Rules, the purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism for 
making relevant information available to the litigants.67 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court noted that mutual knowledge of all of the relevant 
63 § 1.147(e)(1).
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2.
65 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 26 advisory committee notes.
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facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.68 Such 
exchange of information has been highly successful in facilitating 
settlement, as the litigants are then properly able to accurately assess 
the strength or risks of their respective positions in an informed 
manner before proceeding to a hearing of the case with its 
accompanying costs. 
Many agencies such as U.S. Department of Labor, the 
National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Labor Relations Board, 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have extensive and 
detailed rules concerning pretrial discovery.  However, discovery 
under the current Department rules is quite limited.  Witness and 
exhibit lists and copies of exhibits intended to be introduced are 
typically exchanged, but contrary to most procedural rules the 
exchange is not self-executing and the exchange is required only after 
entry of an order by the presiding judge.69
Even where the discovery process is self-executing, continued 
and sometimes significant judicial involvement may be required, as 
the reality is that discovery cannot always operate on a self-
regulating basis.70 While the primary responsibility for conducting 
discovery may rest with the litigants, the obligations to insure that 
they act responsibly and to avoid abuse have to be enforced by the 
presiding judge.
The current minimal exchange of information in 
Departmental proceedings may prove adequate where the issues are 
limited and both sides are already well aware of the underlying facts 
of a particular case, but the limited scope of discovery is less than 
ideal in more complex cases, particularly where expert testimony 
may be introduced.  The current provisions certainly impose no duty 
upon either party to disclose matters that might be exculpatory.  
Provisions concerning disclosures of the underlying factual basis for 
the testimony of an expert witness are completely absent and pretrial 
depositions of experts are seldom authorized. 
In the current rules, depositions may be allowed under limited 
and unusual circumstances.  However, the rules contain no mention 
of the use of other discovery methods such as interrogatories or 
68 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
69 See 7 C.F.R. § 1.140 (2013).
70 See PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN, & MICHAEL J.
KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY
77 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 1978).
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requests for admission. 71 The current provisions also have an 
unusual Jencks Act provision, which requires production of prior 
statements or parts thereof of a witness—being in the possession of a 
complainant—that relate to the witness’s testimony after the witness 
has testified on direct examination.72 This application by importation 
of a federal criminal statute may well create a chimera of the 
Department sharing investigative reports.  Practically speaking, any 
such impression is largely illusory as not only are such reports not 
typically exchanged, but certain parts of the investigative report may 
qualify as being exempt from disclosure and thus may require 
significant redaction of major portions of the report.
A motion for summary adjudication carries the potential to 
dispose of an entire claim or portions of it with finality without a 
trial,73 so it plays a key role in litigation.  The current Department 
rules do not specifically provide for either the use of or exclusion of 
summary judgment.  However, the Department’s Judicial Officer has 
consistently ruled that hearings are futile and summary judgment is 
appropriate where there is no factual dispute of substance.74
While not an exact match, “no factual dispute of substance” 
may be equated with the “no genuine issue as to any material fact” 
language found in the Supreme Court’s decision construing Rule 56 
of the Federal Civil Rules in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.75 The
use of motions for summary judgment within the Department is far 
from uniform.  While certain Office of General Counsel attorneys 
routinely move for summary judgment on behalf of the Department 
in a variety of cases, others will oppose such motions when filed by 
non-governmental parties relying upon section 1.143(b)(2), 76
asserting that such motions are motions regarding a complaint and 
may not be filed unless filed within the time allowed for the filing of 
an answer (twenty days after service of the complaint).77
71 See 7 C.F.R. § 1.148.
72 Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).
73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
74 Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 832 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Animals of Mont., Inc., 68 Agric. Dec. 92, 104 (U.S.D.A. 2009); Kathy Jo 
Bauck, 68 Agric. Dec. 853, 858–59 nn.6–7 (U.S.D.A. 2009) (discussing the use of 
summary judgment in a variety of cases).
75 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
76 7 C.F.R. § 1.143(b)(2).
77 See Complainant’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Woudenberg, (U.S.D.A. 2012) (No. 12-0538). For further information, 
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Change always brings challenges.  However, since all 
members of the bar should have studied and utilized the Federal Civil 
Rules in their practice, it is suggested that the adoption of new 
procedural rules for the Department would not be an unreasonable or 
unmanageable burden.
The gains of judicial efficiency by adopting the Federal Civil 
Rules to the maximum extent possible would be fully realized for all 
parties and the administrative law judges after only a short transition 
period following public notice.  For non-governmental litigants, 
standardizing the Department’s procedural rules to align to the 
Federal Civil Rules and making the rules more familiar to the 
average general practitioner would significantly increase the chances 
of such litigants acquiring counsel in their cases and would open up a 
vastly increased quantity of legal counsel willing to undertake 
representation in such cases (instead of limiting those litigants only to 
those relatively few members of the bar willing to risk malpractice 
exposure because of lack of familiarity with the Department’s 
unusual and very specialized rules).78
It is strongly urged that modernization of the Department’s 
rules is long overdue and that the time has now come for such change 
to be effected for the mutual benefit, fairness, and cost effectiveness 
of all citizens involved in litigation with the Department, as well as 
for the Department itself.
the complaint to the Woudenberg case can be found on the United States 
Department of Agriculture website.  Newsroom, USDA ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH 
INSPECTION SERV. (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2012/09/awa_sept.shtml. 
78 It is noted that the Departmental Equal Access to Justice Act fee awards 
usually does not recognize claims of a U.S.D.A. specialty.  See McDonald v. 
Vilsack, No. 09–0177, 2010 WL 5135281 (U.S.D.A. Nov. 10, 2010).
                                                                                                                                
